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7 Nothing is Free in this Life 
Antonia Pont 
Years ago, while suffering from extreme seasonal allergies, I came across 
something on the internet which clarified for me a crucial aspect of the 
business of marketing. I had tried everything for my tears, runny nose 
and grating, itchy throat, but nothing had worked, and I wasn't willing to 
exacerbate my dependence on antihistamines. 
Willing to read anything that might have a .connection to my condition, 
I happened upon an area of alternative therapy, hitherto unknown to me, 
going under the euphemistic name of 'uropathy' . Now, stated bluntly, urop-
athy consists of drinking your own wee - fresh, sometimes allowed to 
'breathe' - and my source referenced all manner of very interesting research 
on the matter. 
I recommend a web search, if only out of curiosity. The thing that struck 
me, however, in relation to uropathy, which claims for itself amazing cura-
tive powers (and there were numerous miraculous testimonials), was a 
statement by one of its advocates, explaining why uropathy was not likely 
to be promoted by pedestrian, allopathic healing modalities. The writer 
explained that due to the fact that uropathy primarily works when the 
patient consumes their own urine (due to the specific hormonal profile of 
the filtrate), it was never going to be of any use to the medicine business. 
Uropathy, in other words, offers absolutely nothing that can be sold. Urine 
is available enough and since one needs to use one's own, it subverts any 
kind of exchange economy. Abundant and specific- an odd combination in 
itself- urine consumption would then be analogous to an unusual kind of 
self-sufficiency and self-healing potential contained in every human body and 
placing that body"- to some degree- out of the reach of 'pharmaceutical tithe'. 
It is beyond the scope of this chapter to inquire into the current state of 
my hay fever. However, the example of uropathy, as a playful analogy, raises 
certain important questions in relation to the central concern of this book: 
What is it that the creativity market purports to sell? Or, what is creativity and how 
do we situate it theoretically? And, finally, is it scarce? 
To this end, I would firstly like to take up some writings of the French 
thinker Jacques Derri~a and his contributions to our understanding of the 
possible readings of 'creativity' and, more specifically, how creation may be 
distinguished from the category of invention. 
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Creation and Invention 
In. his work, Psyche - Inventions of the Other, Derrida (1987) brings 
attentwn to the distinction between 'creating' and 'inventing'. To create, 
he explams, relates more to notions of genesis. God created the world, for 
example. One does not normally say that he 'invented' it. Creation would 
~mply that out of nothingness, came something. Noting that the category of 
1?vent1?n can imply both 'invention' that pertains to the things invented 
(mventwn as noun) or to the activity of inventing itself (invention as the 
name of an activity), Derrida writes: 
But i? the two cases,, according to the two points of view (object or 
act), mventlon doesn t create an existence or a world as an assembly 
of_ entities, it doesn' t have the theological meaning of a creation of 
eXistence, as such, ex nihilo. (1987: 35) 
Creation, therefore, implies an almost magical process or at least a 
theol_ogically inf~ected one. It would have to do with genera~ing (out' of 
nothing) somethmg. It would not relate to a new approach or an innovative 
utilisation of what was already there. Its definition, in other words would 
not be satisfied by a mere rearrangement, or alteration of form b~sed on 
. . I 
eX1stmg categories or elements. 
If we borrow Derrida's instructive question in this regard: 'Does one 
invent a child?' (1987: 14) or does one create one? the answer - convention-
ally and, s?mehow, intuitively - is that one creates a child. The angle on this 
matter pomts us towards the biological aspect of creation. All livino crea-
t_ures are 'creative', in that they create themselves down the genealogical 
lme. It would be a natural happening and not an exclusively human one. Out 
o~ nothing (~r, at least, two very small things), comes a new being. This is a 
kmd of creat10n. God gave birth to, that is, created the world, and we - beasts 
and creatures - give birth to the next generation. Creation, paradoxically, 
would be both more, and less, surprising than invention, with the theological 
kind of creation lying completely beyond the reach of the mere human and 
the biological kind being typical of the human qua animal. 
Derrida's approach here is useful for our wider inquiry, even if his choice 
of terms might appear to derail our discussion. Yes, we are talking about the 
so_-called creativity market, but if this is a self-given title, the term 'creativity' 
m1ght well be the result of advertising rhetoric, rather than definitional 
ac~u~acy. Aggrandising its promise and desirability, as well as its importance 
Wlthm a marketplace, have those agents who make up the 'creativity mar-
ket' auto-assigned a name for it that rings the most impressive and works 
the most strategically? 
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On the other hand, it is worth noting that the term 'creativiti can also 
function as a slight. The 'creative' within tertiary education has been viewed 
at times disparagingly by other faculties and disciplines of the academy~ as 
if it were somehow less serious .. more immature and less related to the adult 
preoccupations of ipistime (knowledge) and istoria (history). :Creativity'_, in 
this sense1 can be another terrY'~ for the unrigorous, unscientific and flippant. 
I£ we allow ourselves to split hairs, we find that the so-called creativity 
market does not at all pertain to the realm of mating frogs_. budding wizards 
or gods who might be imagined as being capable of Derrida's idea of creation 
ex nihi!o. Rather1 the creativity market more commonly claims to be able to 
sell invenri<~eness (following the Derridean definition); to nurture it and teach 
its whimsical ways. Perhaps the name ~creativity rnarket 1 prevails since it 
flatters a human consumer to believe that she1 or he,. might have this power 
of the gods to make something (other than offspring) appear where there 
was nothing before. However_. to sun1marise Derrida again,. God did not 
invent the world1 and parents do not invent their children. A novelist_. how-
eve(, might invent a new technique in fiction, or a dancer might invent a 
new choreographic syntax. 
Restricted to the so-called biologically natural or to the supernatural; 
creativity may therefore be theoretically distinguished frorr1 inventiveness, 
which- according to Derrida (1987: 36)- is restricted 0\1 the whole to the 
realm of the human and relates to the human's capacity for techni. 
The creativity market_. then1 1night be a misnomer for the market which 
offers to sell to the public the skills_, luck and practices that relate to being 
inventive. Simultaneously; it is also that market which facilitates the 
production of the outco!Y'~es of inventiveness. In other words1 this market 
would produce both inventiveness (as act or experience) and inventions (as 
objects:. films_. novels1 images: happenings). To explain this in another way! 
the creativity market has both a process aspect and a product aspect_. purport-
ing to generate the double-edged outcome of experiences and objects- tfiat 
which can be 'lived' and that which can be 'had'. This reminds us of the old 
Aristotelian distinction of praxis and poiesis1 where the former relates to 
activity in-and-of itself and the latter emphasises the products of activity. 
Individuals and groups who approach the :creativity market-' with vari-
ous wishes1 agendas or hopes may be framed in relation to this double-edge. 
Let us jusr make a loose division and say that some may seek the experience 
of being (what is called) 1Creative' 1 while others might seek the know-how: 
mostly in order to produce the saleable objects or entities that fall somehow 
into the category of _:creative,. or_. even, :artistic'. These might include quirky 
clothing: re-imagined homewares1 industrially designed children1S furniture1 
or noise music for advertising and so on. 
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We rnight also speculate that some consumers in 1creativity markets1 
are .. in fact, unconsciously seeking something theological or :metaphysical". 
Beyond the scope of this discussion, it would be interesting to interrogate 
whether there is a relation between secularisation and an increase in 
the number of people seeking :creative avenues' as a means of facilitating a 
particular kind of existential encounter. 
The invention for Derrida1 despite appearing less magical or miraculous 
rhan his 'creation', is1 upon closer inspection1 at least as complex a notion. 
The Six Criteria of the Invention 
There are six important criteria relevant to our discussion that help 
frame the notion of the invention. These are: 
(a) the invention's illegality; 
(b) the invention as a category pertaining to form and composition; 
(c) the paradox of the invention; 
(d) the iterability of the invention; 
(e) the invention as both a first and last time; and 
(f) invention as 1finding there for the first time 1 . 
These criteria assist in the identification of inventions already in the world. 
Let us examine them more closely 
(a) Illegality 
The first interesting thing that Derrida notes about this category is that 
~an invention always supposes some illegality, the rupture of an implicit 
contract, it introduces disorder into the peaceful order of things .. (1987: 11). 
An invention would somehow always be illegal, radical and a break with 
tradition,. existing codes or the status quo. An invention goes against the 
grain of the order as humans have established it,. forcing something ne\V 
into its grid1 making something that was previously not possible, possible 
and via a contravention. I read this to imply that unless the order is rup-
tured in some way1 there will have been no invention as such. Or. without 
such disturbance to the way things are, the so-called invention 'will have 
be~n a mere reshufflillg a predictable link in an existing chain of everyday 
gomgs-on. 
(b) Form and Composition 
The next aspect of the invention_. Derrida goes on to explain, referencing 
the development of patent law between the 17th and 19th centuries is that 
• I ~ ~ ; 
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curiously. it has legally been defined in relation to form and arrangement: 
rather than to actual content (1987: 14). This would support the aforemen-
tioned creation/invention disrinction1 wherein it is implied that1 in crea-
rion .. something materially new is called into being1 whereas invention 
vvould involve a different kind of 1newness 1 and one intricately bound up 
with rhe human sphere and measurable against it. Inventions emerge 
frorn a context at a particular moment and both that 1momenL1 and the 
particularities of the context are hunum. 
(c) Paradox of the Invention 
An invention: according to Derrida1s definition, operates paradoxically. 
Insofar as it (see a.) always involves a rupture with the existing order and 
legality, it also,. in order to be classed as an invention1 must be taken up and 
recognised by laws and society (Derrida1 1987: 16). The invention breaks 
traditions so as 1 ultimately: to be called into being via their acknowledge-
mem, thereby adding to them. Derrida will say this amounts to the impos-
sibility of a :private: invention and that inventions are therefore creatures 
of the public and, by implication, the social or political realm (1987: 15). It 
is,. in this sense 1 also1 presumably, that they are not :natural'~ but rather} 
produced by, and producing of, human worlds. 
(d) The Invention's Iterability 
Iterability here refers to a capacity to be repeated. Closely related to the 
previous aspect1 it suffices here to quote1 a little lengthily, from Psychi! in 
order to make clear the consequences of both the necessity of invention 
breaking with tradition and also its being called into being by ic 
[The invention] will receive its status of invention! moreover) only to 
:he extent that this socialisation of the thing invented is guaranteed 
by a system of com .. emions that will assure at once inscription in a 
shared history1 belonging to a culture: heritage,. patrimony pedagogical 
nadition1 discipline and chain of generations. The invention begins 
by being able to be repeatedr exploited! reinscribed [my emphasis]. (1987: 
16) 
For the invention not just to be a one-off, abhorrent breaking with tradi-
tion or a queer anomaly) it must demonstrate the capacity to be repeated: 
used and/or exploited. Derrida will even call it a machine (1987: 21), thereby 
hinting towards the invention1s close1 but unexpected) link with human 
technology. 
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(e) Invention as First-and-Last Time 
Stemming from the previous point 1 the invention is the coincidence of 
both an inaugurating time (a ~firse time), but also of a last cime1 insofar as it 
must be unique. As the only :first time11 other 1times 1 will not be classed 
as inventive moments1 but will be merely examples of its inscription in 
the tradition, or the system1 that will take up the invention1S machinic 
possibilities (Derrida, 1987: 16). 
(f) Finding- There For the First Time 
In this final aspect, Derrida recalls the reader to the fact that- according 
to pure definition- invention can be understood as meaning 1finding there 
for the first time,· (1987: 16). Within this definition1 we find the antithesis 
of 1Creation1 • Invention finds and finds what was already there. It is inventive 
because it finds for the {t'rst rime. The finding is unique: but v::fuu is found was 
already at hand with potential, but in an as yet unacknowledged form. 
To risk a simplifying summary. then1 invention would be a new relation-
ship to the raw substance/content already available in the existing context. 
Rather than pertaining to the creation of fresh nuurer1 it involves a discovery 
of an approach1 perspective or structuring that would render the same old 
1Stuff'' uniquely new1 enabling this relationship/configuration to be repeated 
and taken up by the system of relationships in which the matter previously 
existed. 
H1 then1 the criteria outlined above are the means to recognising an 
invention when one comes along1 we are still no closer to understanding 
how inventions arise. Since this is the primary concern of the industries 
or markets that vvould declare themselves 1Creative11 let us examine what 
Derrida says about this. 
What Has Happened When an Invention Happens? 
At this point1 we are able to identify an invention after the fact1 but, 
obviously, the 1Creativity market' would wish to make some claim about its 
ability to shepherd! coerce or facilitate inventive capacity. Derrida distils the 
mechanism of invention down to a ve1y straightfonvard1 but also impossib!e! 1 
coincidence. 
To use Derrida's example: we need to clarify several concepts stemrning 
frorn ~peech Act Theory in linguistics. An important area of debate within 
linguistics relates to the classification of certain statements into those that 
are descriptive (called 1COnstative1) and those that are themselves acts (called 
1performative1). To make it simple1 examples of the latter are usually state-
ments that1 in fact 1 effectuate some change (in legal status~ for example) or 
action through their being uttered. The obvious example is always 'I do' in 
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marriage. On the other hand; an example of the former \".rould be something 
typical, like 'the sky is blue today', a statement that doesn't make anything 
happen (superficially, at least). 
We will leave aside Derrida1s other work that has challenged this sim-
plistic division in Speech Act Theory, howevef; what is useful here is the 
way a discipline (linguistics)) or indeed any systerr11 can set up categories 
and rules that are deemed complete and self-evident; almost :naturally true1 • 
This is where the idea of the iimpossible 1 becomes central. Invention arrives 
in a system or a context where it had seemed that nothing new or radical 
were possible) and this arrival happens via iimpossibility". In other words1 
the impossible can happen and its happening relates to what we understand 
invention to be. 
Taking a work by Francis Ponge1 Derrida gives the reader an example of 
when the constative and the performative categories of linguistics collide 
illegally in a happening that can be deemed 'inventive' and related to the 
so-called iimpossible1 • As a rupture .. whose outcome is iterable1 but also 
unique1 it will be both reliant upon convention and totally subverting of its 
typical use. 'By the word by begins therefore this text' (Derrida, 1987: 19). 
This simple sentence of Ponge1 grammatically sound: at once per(onns itself 
and describes itself at d1e same time. Since most (actually; all1 except those 
that are inventively rupturing) statements tend to manage to fall into 
only one of the categories of Speech Act Theory1 it is a kin.d of event when a 
statement simply and quietly inhabits the two at once.2 Such an ievent!- of 
co-inhabiting- is astounding and :unpre-emptable'1 but (after the fact) not 
impossible at all. Once uttered, any prior, apparent impossibility of the 
statemenfs invention drops away and is nowhere to be found. 
Put simply. once the invented is found, it is difficult to unthi..D.k its fOundness. 
Round things existed: for example) before the invention of the wheel1 
but the application of round-cylindrical-ness to movement may be classed 
as an 'event' for human animals. It is difficult for us (now, at this historical 
moment) to imagine a time prior to the obviousness of the wheers exist,. 
ence. It has already. in other words1 been found for that first time. Once 
employed and used as a machinic pattern1 it can never be f0und1 in that 
initial way again.' 
Inventive Instability 
To describe the movement out of which inventiveness emerges as a 
'collision' between two apparently mutually exclusive states (the 'perfor-
mative' and 'constative', for example, in linguistics) is perhaps to simplify 
what will prove .. upo~ closer observation1 even more interesting. Referenc-
ing the Belgian theorist Paul de Man's comments about the relationship 
between fiction and autobiography/ Derrida writes: 
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The infinitely fast oscillation between performative and constative
1 
language and metalanguage, fiction and non-fiction .. auto- and hetero-
reference etc. does not only produce an essential instability. This 
instability constitutes the event itself1 let's say the oeuvre, the norms1 
statutes and rules of which the invention normally perturbs. (1987: 25) 
By satisfying the definition of the performative and the constative in 
one gesture1 Ponge .. s line (by the word by begins therefore this texe) consti-
tutes a rupturing of an established convention of linguistic logic. To think it 
geometrically: that which was parallel has become circular. The rupture only 
however) puts to use that which our existing grammar and 'sense .. had 
already provided. The inventive structure is found 1 for the first time, there, 
vAt ere ir afw~,?ys was. 
So the event1 for Derrida1 is characterised by an essential instability a 
rapid change of state and a failure- so to speak- of imperatives to obey the 
established categories provided by a system. In this sense, to invent would 
amount to the subversion of binary categories through the taking up o( both 
sides of them in an infinitely accelerated fashion. 
Derrida's Invention and Badiou's Event 
I have used the term :even( above1 to designate Derrida's notion of 
invention) but- given the theoretical players contributing to thought today 
- this sphere of inquiry must also, I believe, give us to think the Badiouian 
event. I would claim, here, that the 'event', as framed by Badiou and then 
Derrida 1S notion of invention) each speaks to the other and that this defini-
tional conversation can persuade us to take notice of what these thinkers 
offer to our understanding of how events come about and what agency 
humans have in relation to them. 
A 1Creativity market 11 whether it chooses to share such a theoretically 
rigorous understanding with its consuming public or not! could still do well 
to have the capacity to think invention-events. On the other hand1 one can 
argue that consumers should be informed about the kinds of things money 
can realistically buy1 and whether inventiveness is one of them. 
Despite relying on vastly different methodological approaches, Derrida 
and Badiou, I believe, inform us about potentially foundational veracities 
concerning 1events:. Let us take up this idea and see if it can contribute to 
clarifying our inquiry about 1Creativity markets ... 3 
An event1 for Derrida and Badiou1 would be something that ruptures. 
For the former1 in relation to invention1 the rupture - always somewhat 
illegal- would arise via a kind of manoeuvre within a context that is both 
perfectly possible retrospectively, but pragmatically impossible to stage prior 
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to itself. The unique constellation that opens the event's possibilities per-
tains to an odd coincidence of naming-as-doing or an oscillation between 
these mutually exclusive categories. As sirr1ple as it sounds to describe, this 
coincidence cannot be made to happen. 
For Badiou, comparatively, the event is undisputedly random and 
beyond human coercion. In his use of set theory; Badiou is able to depict 
very clearly using mathematical isyntax' what is at play in the rupture that 
his event constitutes. He offers the following definition: 
The event (at a given even tal 1site 1) is 1the multiple composed of: on the 
one hand, elements of the site; and on the other hand, itself (the event)'. 
(2007 506) 
The marheme, or formula, of the event is able to be identified as an 
extraordinary kind of set, since it comains itself: ex = {x E X .. e"} (Badiou1 
2007: 179). Such scenarios within mathematics have often been outlawed 
or: at least1 designated as destabilising and undesirable. See, for example, 
Douglas Hofstadter's book I am a Srrange Loop (2007) for a very accessible 
description of these issues for the field of mathematics. Or, the other option 
has be.en for matherr1aticians to employ different systems of classification so 
as to prevent certain inconsistencies from arising (Goldblatt1 2006: 9-12). 
Badiou;s matheme of the event is not unrelated to the arising of the 
event chat Derrida outlines in Psych{ Ponge's 'By the word by .. ' is also a 
kind of set that contains itself By self-referencing, that which would be 
both irsel{and the invention of"itse!fat the same time 1 it initiates a feedback loop, 
and this looping or whirligig :acceleration: (to use Paul de Man's vocabulary 
[1979: 921j) is essential for whatever it is that constitutes the moment of 
the invention-event. 
We can conclude that 1 with its possibility contained within the elements 
of the context or situation itself,. the invention is both an exception to the 
rule and also reliant on nothing that is (not) already there. What does this mean?'. 
Abundant Voids 
For Badiou, an event happens when somehow our day-to-day reality-
its rules, statutes1 practices, technologies: language systems- fails to secure 
itself: and the void of which it is the structured organisation (and only that) 
reveals itself as the ontological foundation. To quote Roffe on this point: ~Its 
border status1 its exposure to uncounted! inconsistent being,. is what opens 
it up to the aleatory' (2006). The rupturing that the event is- completely 
outside of any kind of inscription system that could document or record it 
-disappears as soon as it has occurred. Or1 to quote Roffe again .. 'it also has 
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no temporal reality other than the moment of its (dis)-appearance' (2006). 
The event leaves nothing in its wake and sometimes this 1nothing,. is noticed 
by humans and a process begins.t. 
~ W~ether ev~nts ~re. common or scarce is ... to me1 not completely clear 
trom tne sum ot Bad10u's work I have read .. and perhaps the point is that w:e 
cannot really know. In relation to our ongoing inquiry. ·what femains central 
is that whether scarce or not, the stuff of inventiveness- that is
1 
Nothing-
ness, the Void or accelerated instability- is not something that the market 
can annex: privatise or patent. This Void (of Badiou's) cannot be made 
to disappear entirely, no matter how tightly the reigns of the State or the 
status quo might pull and appear to cover it over. Always there
1 
this 'noth-
ingness~ .. however1 must be secured - thar is1 locked down in the ;count 1 of 
structuring~ organising and disciplining - and we must understand that 
for there to be anything) this~ too .. is cruciaP It is also interesting to note that 
the void1 for humans .. is pure horror .. since we do not exist there and are 
irrelevant. Or_. to anthropomorphise a little1 the void is not dis-interested in 
the human, simply non-interested. 
Due to both the importance of the securing of the void
1 
in order that 
'there is' anything at all, and the necessity that this order be ruptured 
from time to time .. added t01 destabilised1 re-invigorated and toppled .. even1 
humans seem to have a justifiably ambivalent relationship to liminal experi-
ences .. such as inventiveness.6 This ambivalence can give us a hint about the 
role of the :creativity market' and also its lirr1its. 
So, What Can Money Buy Me? 
Given the theoretical: even ontological) discussion above
1 
we return to 
our question of what it is that can be sold under the rubric of :crearivity'. 
Let us quote Derrida again: 
If the word 'invention~ knows a new liveliness1 upon a foundation 
of anguished exhaustion! but also since the very desire to re-invent the 
invention itsel( and to the point of re-inventing its statute1 it is without 
doubt in relation to a scale that is unmeasurable against that of the 
past1 that which one calls the 1invention1 to be patented finds itself 
programmed .. that it is to say) submitted to poV:erful movements of 
prescription and authoritarian anticipation1 ~f which the modes are 
most numerous. And this as much in the domains called arr or fine arts
1 
as in the techno-scientific realms. Everywhere the projects of knowledge 
and research are firstly programma tics of invention. [ ... ] One could 
evoke also all the institutions) private or public1 capitalist or not1 who 
declare themselves the machines for the production and orientation of 
the invention. (1987: 39) 
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Derrida notes an urge to want to re~invent what inventiveness is and 
notes that} at the sarne time 1 powerful forces are at work hoping to corral 
the stuff of inventiveness. Seminars; self-help books1 tertiary institutions1 
privately-run weekend retreatS 1 think-tanks,. research institutes (to name 
a few) the market that sells creativity and the bodies that would claim to 
have its key seem to have something to offer .. but1 as we1ve read above,. they 
can1t have nothing to sell. 
If the Badiouian Void, or the inherent instability or oscillation of which 
Derrida speaks, is somehow always already there and un-quashable, what 
factors influence or enhance a person1 S or organisation1S ability to mobilise 
or to promise the delivery of that from which inventiveness springs? 
L~t us acknowledge a disconcerting coincidence. As a Caucasian1 female1 
Australian-born, human animal, I can say that at this historical moment I 
am regularly subjected to forces demanding an obedience to statutes, laws, 
etiquettes1 career and life trajectories .. financial behaviours: etc. and, at the 
same time, am constantly targeted as a unit who might wish to consume 
products or services that declare themselves the means for the escaping of 
such confining (yet securing) structures. Allowing for specific geographical 
and societal differences} one could speculate that this bind is sornething 
shared by many people across the globe who are subjected to considerable 
amounts of media and advertising) at the same time as knowing acutely the 
den1ands of the conventions and lore of their specific context.7 
Beyond the narro~Ar definition of the :creativiti market1 perhaps markets 
in general do, and have always, to a certain degree, promised the kind of 
existential escape routes that the creativity market 1 of late,, explicitly claims 
to offer. 
This may be exactly what Derrida is pointing to when he says that we 
dream of re-inventing the invention: 
Today, it is perhaps because we know too well the existence at least 
if not the functioning of invention-programming-machines) that 
we dream of reinventing the invention beyond the matrices of the 
programme. For,. is a programmed invention still an invention? Is it an 
event through which the future comes to us? (1987: 40) 
In relation to this question; I would emphasise here a strategic necessity. 
It is the irr1portance of paying very close attention to vocabulary.. with a 
view to paying close attention to ontology, so to speak. We need to clarify 
the ontology of inventions in the face of markets that are seeking to do 
what markets do1 tha~ is1 generate velocities of exchange. We need to think, 
with curiosity and fierceness., into the possibilities of what money can buy, 
since it buys very many lovely things. 
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Nothingness,. I would like to propose .. finally; is not for sale~ but instruc-
tion regarding~ and environments conducive to, particular 'nothingness .. 
practices might be. 
The Lucrative Wisdom of Inventiveness? 
Let us call again on the distinction noted above between the experience 
of inventing and the products of invention ~experiences and things. It is quite 
obvious that :newness: is a very saleable quality. 1\:luch of what passes for 
newness~ ho\vever .. is of the stale1 programmed type noted by Derrida in the 
passage above. As a mere rearrangement of existing elements1 it would not 
constitute a rupture. 
Bombarded vvith the advertising speak of :all new)·'~ consumers may.. and 
will1 allow themselves to believe that some trace of the void (or a rupture of 
their unbearable daily normality) wi!I grace them if they acquire a ne~ style, 
a new piece of technology, etc. This is a furphy and anyone who has shopped 
knows the let-down of this mistaken hope. A particular intellectual rigour 
or simple street-smartness might be enough, at least1 to decelerate the inci-
dents of unnecessary consumption elicited by claims of pseudo invention-
events. Or .. in the absence of this, shopping (and this includes for education) 
might simply emerge as what it is: the acquiring of more things/skills~ some 
necessary, some not. A justifiable and pragmatic human activity among 
many.. but by no means expected to be revolutionary or revelatory. 
On the other hand - as is often the case with the fine arts and its 
products1 so-called :design11 the literary business,, etc.~ something else is at 
stake in the wanting to attain proximity to someone else·'s invention event. 
In the absence of being inventive oneself_, the possession of the trace of 
inventiveness (so-called creaLive products) may still seem appealing. This 
more vicarious aspect comes1 perhaps_, closer to what might be a driving 
factor in those markets tern1ed specifically 1Creative ... 
So if most 1newness·' isn1 t really new and being close to the traces of 
inventiveness is not the same as inventiveness itself) what1 then1 is saleable; 
given all our previous discussions about the nature of invention-events? 
Let us propose that, despite humans not being able to influence the 
arising of events1 specific human animals may have more or less aptitude; or 
practice,, in noticing events tFhen they do happen and being there to 'follow 
through~ when events/invention arrive. Were there to be anything in which 
a :creativity market·' could trade; it might be in the teaching of what I 
propose to term an 'even tal sensitivity' -a kind of preparedness. This may 
be what is purportedly on offer during creativity seminars,, in the university 
classroorr1 and within the covers of self-help books. If creativity markets are 
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able to offer anything realistic) it is via this aspect. Providing employment 
for many people (many of whom are artists .. researchers and creative 
practitioners themselves)~ these markets are clearly ~selling· something) and 
their product is neither toxic,· unethical, nor even- if they pay attention to 
invention .. s ontology- deceitful. 
Conclusion: Nothing is for Free 
The old traces of inventiveness rr1ake up the majority o£ what we would 
call our cultural and technological canons1 indeed~ our civilisations. To 
read, 100 years after the fact, the literary works of an originally inventive 
writer is surely to be graced by beauty and to be groomed in sensitivity to 
somerhirzg. This something might be human psychology certain aesthetic 
qualities or grammatical elegance1 among other things. In other words: 
light1 colour: form 1 imagination or rhythrn. To read will not necessarily 
constitute inventiveness: but it will nor necessarily impede it1 and it may 
even contribute to the possibility of the reader 1s noticing, and being able 
:o respond/ to an event when it does arise. 
The void of Badiou is mostly quite securely 1locked up1 in structure 
bur not entirely. As Badiou will explain) it can be seen to 1haunt' the situa-
tion, but in non-presentation (see 2007: 94). This void is.beyond the reach 
of any market -a fact which renders it both frustratingly evasive to those 
vvishing to herd it into an exclusive and lucrative forrn by prorr1ising to 
sell the paradox of inventiveness: but also reassuringly resistant. 
To conclude; then,. let's say that an artist (in the broadest sense) may be 
that kind of creature who practices both a fluency in the rules: codes and 
techniques of the situation or current historical context1 but who does not 
confuse this programmatic competency with the stuff of true invention, 
vvhich is: in fact,. nothingness or the void- that which is always there to be 
found and which is always already fOr fl·ee. 
Notes 
(1)' This use of the term 'impossible' in Derrida's though is not casuaL 'Impossibility' 
for Derrida may be the very condition of that which renders any inventiveness~. 
change, or justice-w-come possible at all. In other words, he proposes that something 
abLe w shift dominant patterns or old hierarchies is likely to involve a passage through 
'impossibility'. 
(2) l say this. weE aware that Derrida .. s work of deconsuuciion challenges such bifurca-
tions. The mutual exclusiveness, however. of these categories traditionally persists 
vvithin systems that. declare them ~ linguistics, for example, bm it could be art, 
history or literature at given historical moments ~ and the system supports itself 
upon the very structure of that C2,tegorisation. 
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(3) This chapter is clearly not the forum for a detailed and rigorous interrogation of 
t~is claim conc:ming th~ resonance betwee~ a Derridean and Badiouian thinking 
o~ che .event. ~owever, r.or ch~ purposes ot opening the debate and stimulating 
drscuss10n pertment to thrs booK, the claim_. I believe, is useful or at least fruitfully 
provocative. 
(4) This is a colloquial summary of the cemral argument of Being and Evem (Badiou, 
2007). Please refer to this work for closer elaboration. 
(5) This difference between 'ls' and 'there d is central to 'Meditation One' of Being 
and Evem (Badiou, 2007: 23ff) and nods in the direnion of the old Question \vhv is 
there something rather than chaos?' · ~ 
(6) Just as they might be ambivalent about the four categories of truth procedures 
outlined in both volumes of Being and Evem: the amorous, the political, the scientific 
and the artistic {see, for example, Badiou, 2009: 77). 
(7) The discomfort of this kind of irresolvable bind is, in any case, surely' good for encour-
aging spending. the mantra of marketing pedagogy being to create a glaring problem 
and then to offer the soluiion at a price. 
(8) This touches on an important s~milarity, but apparent distinction, between Derrida 
and Badiou. Derrida collapses two aspens of the invention- namelv the event of its 
rupture and then the taking up of it; possibility within the human' context through 
statute, pa:ent, etc. Badiou, on the other hand, but really in a comparable geswre, 
separates the event (as rupture) from the 'truth procedure' of the subject. vvho 
works to force into encyclopaedic knowledge the new uuth revealed by the ~vent. 
Derrida will name both phases the 'invention',: Badiou will use two different terms. 
Nevertheless, the theoretical manoeuvre is arguably comparable. 
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